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A SPIN-OFF SPINs iN Two DmECTONS
1. Introduction: Facts1
Before July 1, 1961, the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company [here-
inafter referred to as "Pacific"], a subsidiary of American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, provided service for the four-state area of California, Oregon,
Washington, and Idaho. Because of the tremendous economic expansion in this
area and for other business reasons, the Pacific management decided to divide
the corporation. To this end a new corporation, Pacific Northwest Bell Tele-
phone Company [hereinafter referred to as "Northwest"], was created. All the
non-California assets of Pacific were transferred to Northwest pursuant to the
following plan: the non-California assets and liabilities plus $110,000 in cash
went to Northwest in return for the issuance of 30,460,000 shares of Northwest
common stock and an interest-bearing demand note in the amount of
$200,000,000. These transfers left Northwest with a capital structure similar
to that of Pacific. The plan further required that Pacific offer to its shareholders
the right to purchase, pro rata, all of the Northwest stock held by Pacific. The
price of the stock and the number of offerings, however, were matters solely
within the discretion of Pacific's management. The plan provided generally that
these distributions and price decisions were to be made in response to the capital
requirements of Pacific. It was anticipated that all of the Northwest stock would
be distributed within three years.
Exercising its discretion, the Pacific management on September 20, 1961,
issued one transferable stock right for each outstanding share of Pacific stock.
In order to subscribe to one share of Northwest stock, each Pacific shareholder
was required to submit six of these rights and sixteen dollars. This initial distribu-
tion transferred about 57% of the Northwest stock held by Pacific. This per-
centage was chosen by Pacific's management to enable American Telephone and
Telegraph Company to gain control of Northwest immediately following the first
phase of the distribution. On June 12, 1963, almost two years after the initial
distribution, Pacific made the second and final offering of the remaining 43%
of the Northwest stock. The terms of this offering required eight stock rights
and sixteen dollars for one share of Northwest stock. Pacific adopted this rather
complicated distribution scheme in order to divide its corporate organization
along operational lines and simultaneously satisfy its very large requirements
for additional capital to finance expansion.
Oscar E. Baan of Sausalito, California, and Irving Gordon of New York
City held stock in Pacific prior to the distribution, and both took advantage of
the distribution plan by acquiring shares in Northwest. Prior to the first offering,
and in response to a request by the Pacific management, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue issued two ruling letters2 that concluded that the sale of the
rights would produce ordinary income and that their exercise would produce
taxable dividend income under section 301 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1 The facts are set out in great detail in Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 72-86 (1965).
2 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 85 (1965).
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1954.' He further warned that the requirements for a tax-free stock distribution
under section 3554 were not met.5
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301.
4 INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 355:
(a) Effect on Distributees.-
(1) General Rule-If-
'(A) a corporation (referred to in this section as the "distributing corpora-
tion") -
(i) distributes to a shareholder, with respect to its stock, or
(ii) distributes to a security holder, in exchange for its securities,
solely stock or securities of a corporation (referred to in this section as "con-
trolled corporation") which it controls immediately before the distribution.
(B) the transaction was not used principally as a device for the distribu-
tion of the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled
corporation or both (but the mere fact that subsequent to the distribution stock
or securities in one or more of such corporations are sold or exchanged by all
or some of the distributees (other than pursuant to an arrangement negotiated
or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be construed to mean that
the transaction was used principally as such a device),
(C) the requirements of subsection (b) (relating to active businesses) are
satisfied, and
(D) as part of the distribution, the distributing corporation distributes-
(i) all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation held
by it immediately before the distribution, or
(ii) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation constituting
control within the meaning of section 368(c), and it is established to the
satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that the retention by the dis-
tributing corporation of stock (or stock and securities) in the controlled
corporation was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to (and no amount shall be includible
in the income of) such shareholder or security holder on the receipt of such stock
or securities.
"(2) Non Pro Rata Distributions, etc. - Paragraph (1) shall be applied without
regard to the following:
(A) whether or not the distribution is pro rata with respect to all of the
shareholders of the distributing corporation,
(B) whether or not the shareholder surrenders stock in the distributing
corporation, and
(C) whether or not the distribution is in pursuance of a plan of reorgani-
zation (within the meaning of section 368 (a) (1) (D)).
'(3) Limitation. - Paragraph (1) shall not apply if-
(A) the principal amount of the securities in the controlled corporation
which are received exceeds the principal amount of the securities which are
surrendered in connection with such distribution, or
(B) securities in the controlled corporation are received and no securities
are surrendered in connection with such distribution.
For purposes of this section (other than paragraph (1) (D) of this subsection) and
so much of section 356 as relates to this section, stock of a controlled corporation
acquired by the distributing corporation by reason of any transaction which occurs
within 5 years of the distribution of such stock and in which gain or loss was
recognized in whole or in part, shall not be treated as stock of such controlled cor-
poration, but as other property.
(4) Cross Reference.-
For treatment of the distribution if any property is received which is not per-
mitted to be received under this subsection '(including an excess principal amount
of securities received over securities surrendered), see section 356.
'(b) Requirements as to Active Business.-
(1) In General. - Subsection (a) shall apply only if either-
(A) the distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation (or if
stock of more than one controlled corporation is distributed, each of such cor-
porations), is engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct
of a trade or business, or
(B) immediately before the distribution, the distributing corporation had
no assets other than stock or securities in the controlled corporations and each
of the controlled corporations is engaged immediately after the distribution in
the active conduct of a trade or business.
[February, 1968]
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After taxpayers Gordon and Baan exercised their stock rights, they took
the position that their newly acquired stock was not taxable because it fell under
the protection of section 355, and therefore neither taxpayer reported gain or
loss in connection with his receipt of the Northwest shares. The Commissioner
assessed deficiencies against both, restating his opinion letter to the effect that
section 355 was inapplicable to this distribution, and because it did not apply,
the taxpayers had realized dividend income to the extent that Northwest stock
had a fair market value in excess of the subscription price.
In a consolidated case, the Tax Court decided that section 355 did apply
and that the distribution to the taxpayers, Gordon and Baan, was tax free.6
The Commissioner appealed, taking taxpayer Baan, a resident of California,
to the Ninth Circuit, and taxpayer Gordon, a resident of New York, to the
Second Circuit. In Commissioner v. GordonT the Second Circuit affirmed for
the taxpayer, but the Ninth Circuit held for the government in Commissioner
v. Baan.8
These opposite decisions, spawned by the same "spin-off" transaction, were
the result of conflicting interpretations of section 355. However, before analyzing
these two results, it is first necessary to study the elements of a spin-off transaction
in order to understand the application of section 355 to the Pacific-Northwest
arrangement.
II. The Spin-off
The spin-off is one of three methods commonly used to accomplish the
divisive reorganization of a corporate structure. The other two devices are labeled
the "split-up" and the "split-off."' Although the methods of separation differ
materially, the essential characteristic of all three is the distribution by a parent
corporation to its shareholders of stock in a newly created or an existing sub-
sidiary.
The Pacific transaction, illustrative of a typical spin-off, involved: 1) the
(2) Definition. -For purposes of paragraph '(1), a corporation shall be treated
as engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business if and only if -
(A) it is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business, or substan-
tially all of its assets consist of stock and securities of a corporation controlled
by it (immediately after the distribution) which is so engaged,
(B) such trade or business has been actively conducted throughout the
5-year period ending on the date of the distribution,
(C) such trade or business was not acquired within the period described
in subparagraph (B) in a transaction in which gain or loss was recognized in
whole or in part, and
(D) control of a corporation which '(at the time of acquisition of control)
was conducting such trade or business -
(i) was not acquired directly (or through one or more corporations)
by another corporation within the period described in subparagraph (B), or
(ii) was so acquired by another corporation within such period, but
such control was so acquired only by reason of transactions in which gain
or loss was not recognized in whole or in part, or only by reason of such
transactions combined with acquisitions before the beginning of such period.
5 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 1967).
6 Oscar B. Baan, 45 T.C. 71 (1965).
7 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499 '(2d Cir. 1967).
8 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
9 For purposes of explaining the differences between the three types of divisive reorgani-
zations, we will assume that A, the original corporate party, manages two businesses, the x
business and the y business.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
creation of a new corporation, Northwest; 2) the transfer of assets representing
an existing business to this new corporation in exchange for the newly issued
shares of Northwest; 3) the control by Pacific of the Northwest shares im-
mediately prior to distribution; 4) the distribution to Pacific stockholders of
Northwest stock, by means of a stock option process, without requiring the re-
turn of any Pacific stock. Except for the intervention of the stock rights scheme,
the Pacific plan is a classic example of the corporate spin-off.
Pacific rejected the conventional spin-off, partly because of various state
law obstacles"° and, partly because the parent American Telephone and Tele-
graph corporation had filed a consolidated tax return that eliminated inter-
corporate dividends, making qualification under section 355 of little importance
to the corporate management. 1 To minority stockholders, Gordon and Baan,
however, qualification under section 355 would effect substantial tax savings.
"It is their position that regardless of what the Pacific management intended,
the distribution should be given the preferred tax treatment provided by Section
355."12
III. Section 355
The taxation of divisive reorganizations is covered in the 1954 Code ex-
clusively by section 355. " If the requirements of this section are met, a corporate
Split-up: A forms two new corporations, B and C. A transfers the x business to B and the y
business to C. In exchange, A receives the new stock of B and C. The stock of B and C
in the hands of A is then distributed to A's shareholders in return for their old A shares and
then A liquidates. The old A shareholders thus own the same assets, but through two new
corporations, B and C.
Split-off: A forms only one new corporation, B. A transfers the x business to B, but retains
the y business. In exchange for the x business, A receives the new stock of B. The stock of
B in the hands of A is then distributed to A's shareholders in return for a portion of their
old A shares. After this distribution, the shareholders own the same assets, but now they own
the y business through the old corporation (A) and the x business through the new corpora-
tion (B).
Spin-off: This device is exactly like the split-off except that the A shareholders do not have
to hand in any of their presently held A shares when the new stock (of B) is distributed to
them. After this distribution, the shareholders do hold more stock through the two corporate
entities, but the actual value of their holdings is not increased.
For a good breakdown of all three types, see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 11.01, at 450-51 (2 ed. 1966); J. REEVES,
TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE MERGERS, EXCHANGES, REDEMPTIONS, LIQUIDATIONS AND RE-
ORGANIZATIONS 103-06 (1967); Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin Off, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3
(1967).
10 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 78-9 '(1966).
11 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1967).
12 Id. at 502-03.
13 For the text of § 355, see note 4 supra. An examination of subchapter C, Part III, of
the 1954 Code indicates a congressional intent to bring all divisive reorganizations under the
purview of section 355. In order to prevent a tax-free division under the general reorganiza-
tion section of the Code (§ 368), Congress added a clause at the end of section 368(a) (1)
(D). The additional clause requires that a corporation forming a controlled subsidiary must
distribute stock of the subsidiary to its shareholders in a transaction that qualifies under section
354, 355, or 356, in order to have a reorganization which qualifies under section 368. Section
368 (a) (2)'(A) requires that a transfer of assets that could qualify as a reorganization under
both section 368(a)'(1) (C) and (D) must be treated as falling under subparagraph (D) only.
All such transfers then must qualify under section 354 or 355. Section 354 applies to a
reorganization under section 368(a) (1) (D) only if the transferee corporation acquires
"substantially all of the assets" of the transferor corporation, and the transferor then dis-
tributes all its assets pursuant to a plan of reorganization. If only some of the assets are trans-
ferred or if the transferor does not liquidate then section 354 is inapplicable. A corporate
division is not present if "substantially all" the assets of the transferor are turned over to
[February, 1968]
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division with its resulting stock distribution can be effectuated with no recogni-
tion of gain, loss, or income attributed to the distributee shareholders. The section
has been of little benefit to taxpayers, however, because of the restrictive attitude
taken by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has con-
sistently demanded that the facts of the transaction conform strictly to both the
statute and the regulations." Thireen years of cases and rulings on this section
have produced seven basic requirements that must be satisfied if a corporate
division is to be carried out with full tax benefit to the shareholders. These
requirements are:
1) The subsidiary, whose stock is distributed to the parent stockholders,
must be controlled by the distributing parent at the time of (immediately before)
the distribution."
2) The controlling corporation must distribute all (or at least 80%) of
the stock of the controlled subsidiary which it owns immediately before the dis-
tribution. 6
3) The distribution must not be used as a "device" for the distribution of
earnings and profits of the distributing or controlled corporations.1
4) Immediately after the distribution, both the distributing corporation
and the controlled corporation must be engaged in the active conduct of a trade
or business; or, if the assets of the distributing corporation consist solely of stock
or securities in two or more controlled corporations (split-up), each of the con-
trolled corporations must be so engaged.1
5) The above requirement relating to the active conduct of a trade or
business is satisfied only if the trade or business was conducted over the five-
year period ending on the distribution date. 9
6) There must be a continuity of shareholder interest between the transferor
parent company and the transferee controlled subsidiary."
7) There must be a valid business purpose behind the divisive reorganiza-
tion.2" With these basic requirements in mind, we can now look to the conflict
the transferee subsidiary, thus section 354 by its terms excludes what section 355 specifically
includes. See S. RaP,. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1954); Simon, Tax-free Cor-
porate Divisions: They Are Still a Danger Area After Ten Years, J. TAXATION, vol. 23, July
1965, at 24.
14 See, e.g., U.S. v. Marett, 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963) where the Commissioner's
attempt to enforce Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (1955) was characterized as "... more than an
attempt to put a 'gloss' on the statutory requirement." Id. at 30.
15 INT. RY. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a)'(1) (A). The parent "controls" a subsidiary
if it owns stock in the subsidiary giving it at least 80% of the total combined voting power
of all the voting stock and at least 80% of the total of all other classes of the subsidiary's
stock. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c). The Treasury understands "all" other classes
to mean "each" of the other classes. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 115.
16 INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 355(a) (1) (A), 355 (a)'(1) (D). Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)
(1955).
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1955).
18 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(b) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-4(a) (1955).
19 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(b)'(2) (B); Treas. Reg. § 355-4(b) (1955).
20 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-2(b) (1) and (c) (1955). In a split-off, the old shareholders
must return at least 80% of the transferee's stock, but there are exceptions. In special situa-
tions new stockholders may be permitted to join without detrimental tax consequences, pro-
vided the circumstances disclose no intention to use the division as a device to distribute earn-
ings and profits. Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959 -1 Cum. BULL. 77.
21 The business purpose rule is not a mandate of the statute itself. It traces its origins
to a requirement stated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). This requirement is
now embodied in the Treasury Regulations at § 1.355.2(c) '(1955). This requirement is
NOTES
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in the two cases under discussion. Their final resolution will surely redefine and
expand these requirements.
In the very beginning, it should be noted that the two appellate courts
could not agree on the legislative purpose underlying the enactment of section
355, and this basic rift was responsible for the contrary decisions on the specific
determinative issues in the two cases. The best approach in analyzing the two
cases is to start with contentions of the Commissioner and the manner in which
the Tax Court and each Circuit dealt with them. Four of these contentions
framed the determinative issues in both courts. 1) The first and truly decisive
question before both courts was the general one: How shall section 355 be con-
strued? The Commissioner contended ". . . that Section 355 was merely a tax
concession granted by Congress to permit certain narrowly defined transactions.
He concludes that .. . the statute is to be narrowly construed."22 (Emphasis
added.) Assuming the validity of this preliminary argument, the Commissioner
used it as the basis for his specific contentions. 2) The Commissioner contended
in both cases that section 355(a) (1) (A) (i) required that stock of Northwest
Telephone be distributed by Pacific with respect to the Pacific stock. 3 In break-
ing this argument down for analysis, it falls into two parts. (A) In the first part
of this contention, the Commissioner argued that the thing distributed must be
stock, and that stock rights do not satisfy the statutory requirements. (B)
Secondly, he contended that the distribution must be with respect to the Pacific
stock and that the introduction of the sixteen dollars as a conversion requirement
inserted an additional factor in the basis for distribution, and thus disrupted the
continuity of shareholder interest, and took the transaction out of section 355.
3) The Commissioner contended further that there is an implied requirement
in section 355 that the distribution of stock take place in a single offering. It was
his view that because Pacific utilized a plan of distribution that called for two
offerings separated by two years, and because the initial distribution did not
transfer the 80% "control" required by section 355 (a) (1) (D), the distribution
failed to qualify under the section.24 4) Finally, he argued that, contrary to the
requirement of section 355 (b) (2) (C), Northwest acquired its assets from Pacific
through a transaction in which gain was "recognized.1 25 These contentions and
their respective answers from the Second and Ninth Circuits will be analyzed
below.
IV. Construction
In Gordon and in Baan "... . the truly decisive question before this Court
separate from the statutory caveat that forbids transactions that are merely devices for the
distribution of earnings and profits. A division that is not intended as such a device may still
fail because it is unsupported by a business purpose. Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184,
187-88 (9th Cir. 1965).
22 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 504 (2d Cir. 1967). This same underlying
contention is implicit in Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
23 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 505 (2d Cir. 1967). The same contention
is found in Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1967).
24 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 507 (2d Cir. 1967). The same contention:
Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 492 '(9th Cir. 1967).
25 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 91-2 '(1965). Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499,
506 (2d Cir. 1967). Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1967).
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is how Section 355 shall be construed."2 On the one hand it was the view of
Judge Moore in Gordon that corporate divisions are desirable as a matter of
policy. While recognizing that corporate divisions represent an excellent way to
"bail out" earnings, he seemed to imply that once the court is sure that the
spin-off is not being used as such a "device" under section 355(a) (1) (B),
judicial policy should lend encouragement to the divisive reorganization. 7
In contrast, Judge Hanley in Baan sketched the history of the section, em-
phasizing the restrictive nature of the various additions and amendments. He
viewed the section as a congressional concession requiring each transaction to
meet "carefully specified conditions."2"
Historically, congressional treatment of the spin-off transaction has not been
consistent.29 Before 1924, a "split-off" and "split-up" were deemed nontaxable
if accomplished as part of a corporate reorganization, but a spin-off did not
receive this favorable tax treatment.30 The spin-off was considered to be a
severance of assets of the distributing corporation and was taxable as ordinary
dividend income. In the Revenue Act of 1924,31 Congress first permitted a
spin-off division to operate tax free. Similar enactments followed the 1924
statute and continued this policy for the next ten years.32 But none of these
acts placed any restriction as to what could be spun-off, and this created a
loophole whereby dividend income could be converted into capital gains. A
corporation would form a subsidiary, transfer all its liquid assets to the sub-
sidiary and then place liquid assets in the hands of its shareholders by liquidating
the subsidiary, thus enabling the shareholders to report the assets distributed as
capital gains rather than ordinary dividends. 2 This "bail out" of earnings and
profits produced an unfavorable reaction in Congress, and in 1934, the spin-off
section was eliminated from the Revenue Act. 4
In 1951, Congress reinstated the spin-off provision by adding section
112(b)(11) to the 1939 Code. 3  This spin-off provision drew much tighter
restrictions around the tax-free status accorded the spin-off transaction than
26 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1967).
27 Id. at 504.
28 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1967). "Men must turn square
corners when they deal with the government." Rock Island, A. & L. R.R. v. United States,
254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
29 For a thorough survey of the history of § 355, see B. BI-rER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATxoN oF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, § 11.02 (2d ed. 1966). For a
case which discusses this history, see Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1962).
30 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202, 40 Stat. 1060 '(1919). S. REP. No. 617, 65th
Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1918); also found in 1939-1 (Part 2) Cums. BULL. 120 (1939).
31 Ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 256 (1924). See H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1924); also found in 1939-1 (Part 2) Cum. BULL. 251 '(1939).
32 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 203(c), 44 Stat. 13 (1926). Revenue Act of 1928,
ch. 852, § 112(g), 45 Stat. 818 (1928); Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 112(g), 47 Stat.
197 '(1932).
33 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), held that full compliance with the letter
of the spin-off statute was not enough if the transaction was otherwise indistinguishable from
an ordinary dividend.
34 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 704 (1934). See H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934); also found in 1939-1 (Part 2) Cum. BULL. 564 (1939).
35 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1. § 112(b) 53 Stat. 37, as amended, Revenue Act of
1951, ch. 521, § 317, 65 Stat. 493 (1951). See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58
(1951), also found in 1951-1 Cuss. BULL. 499 (1951).
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did the pre-1934 laws. The section provided that tax-free status was not to be
extended to a spin-off if it appeared (1) that the transaction was used principally
as a "device" for distributing earnings and profits to the shareholders of any
corporation that was a party to the reorganization; and (2) that any corporation
which was a party to such reorganization was not intended to continue in the
active conduct of a trade or business after such reorganization. 6 The 1951
enactment also provided that no tax-free distributions could be effected unless
they were made pursuant to a reorganization under section 112(g) (1) (D)."
The 1954 Code did not change the basic thrust of the 1951 law, but it did
produce some substantial alterations.3" While setting out more intricate restric-
tions and generally providing a more extensive treatment of the spin-off trans-
action, the 1954 enactment nonetheless liberalized the 1951 law in many im-
portant respects. For example, the new law abolished the requirement that the
distribution be made pursuant to a reorganization. 9 Also, the distributing cor-
poration is now permitted to retain stock and security of the previously con-
trolled corporation, providing stock constituting "control" is distributed, and it
can be established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that it is not pursuant to
a plan having as one of its principle purposes the avoidance of federal income
tax liability.4" The old law, however, was tightened by subsection 355(b)
which introduced more elaborate restrictions and definitions into the "active
business" requirement. 4
The Commissioner contends that section 355, as first enacted in 1951 and
as it now appears in the 1954 Code, was only a concession by Congress to the
business community, and, therefore, that its provisions should be tightly con-
strued. As already noted, this is the view taken by Judge Hamley in Baan.
This attitude, however, is not evident in the Senate Report which merely points
out, "Section 355 corresponds to that portion of Section 112(b)(3) of the
1939 Code which relates to divisive reorganizations of corporations including
'split-ups' and 'split-offs' and to Section 112(b) (11) of such code relating to
corporate 'spin-offs.' "42
Because the question posed by the Commissioner's contention concerns the
original intent of Congress in reinstating the spin-off provision, the answer lies
in the legislative history of the 1951 enactment." The House committee report
on the 1951 law sheds some interesting light on the problem. After describing
the operation of a "spin-off" and its new tax-free status under the proposed
provision, the committee report explained:
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A127
(1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266-67 (1954).
39 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 355(a) (2) (C). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
266 (1954).
40 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 266 (1954).
41 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 355(b). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 268
(1954).
42 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1954).




This section has been included in the bill because your committee
believes that it is economically unsound to impede spin-offs which break-up
businesses into a greater number of enterprises, when undertaken for
legitimate business purposes. 4"
This language seems to suggest that the encouragement of spin-offs is a
good economic policy and, if made for a legitimate business purpose, they ought
to be facilitated by means of favorable tax treatment. Of the two conflicting
opinions, the one in Gordon seems closer to the spirit of the committee report.
It reads in part:
Congress recognized, of course, that corporate divisions are a perfect
vehicle for bail-outs of earnings and profits and, therefore, hedged in the
use of Section 355 with a number of conditions which must be met. But
when the division presents no opportunity for a bail out, these, conditions
should not be so construed as to frustrate the basic congressional purpose. 5
In accordance with this view, the Gordon court looked at the transaction and,
after determining that it was not a bail out or tax evasion "device," felt obliged
to apply a liberal interpretation of section 355 to that transaction. This contrast
between the two courts in their general approach to the section itself is further
illustrated by the way they dealt with the three specific issues.
V. "Distributes... with respect to its stock.., solely stock or securities"
Subsection 355 (a) (1) (A) of the 1954 Code states one of the conditions
with which a distribution must comply in order for a shareholder or security
holder to claim the tax benefits of the section.
(a) Effect on Distributees.
(1) General Rule. If -
(A) a corporation (referred to in this section as the "distributing
corporation") -
(i) distributes to a shareholder, with respect to its stock, or
(ii) distributes to a security holder, in exchange for its
securities,
solely stock or securities of a corporation (referred to in this section
as "controlled corporation") which it controls immediately before the
distribution,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized ....
The Commissioner contended that subsection (a) (1) (A) (i) required that
solely stock or securities of Northwest be distributed by Pacific with respect to the
Pacific stock. Upon analysis, this contention has two parts: (1) that stock rights
do not qualify as solely stock or securities under subsection (a) (1) (A) (i),
and (2) that "distribution . . .with respect to its stock" means only stock or
securities held by the shareholder and excludes the use of cash consideration or
contribution as a basis for distribution."
The Commissioner took the position in the Tax Court that stock rights
44 Id.
45 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 504 (2d Cir. 1967).
46 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 90 (1965); Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 505
(2d Cir. 1967); Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1967).
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do not come within the definition of "solely stock or securities" which words
are used to define and limit the things that may be distributed under the section.
Support for this view is found in the Income Tax Regulations at section
1.355-1 (a)."'
Judge Raum in the Tax Court opinion labeled this interpretation "highly
technical and inhospitable."48 He pointed out that the Commissioner's argument
assumes that the stock rights themselves, rather than the stock obtained by ex-
ercising those rights, were the subject of that distribution. It is clear that the
distribution of rights or warrants on corporate equity may not be considered
a distribution of corporate earnings and profit.49 The only way that any income
can be charged to the distributees and taxed under section 301 is by recognizing
a distribution upon the exercise of the stock rights. When the rights are exercised
the stock itself is distributed, and this distribution is dearly within the statutory
language. According to Judge Raum's reasoning, we must look for the distribu-
tion only when the rights are exercised because it is the only distribution that
could possibly be subject to taxation.
In the second part of his contention, the Commissioner shifted his emphasis
from the thing distributed to the basis for the distribution. Here he urged that
the phrase "with respect to its stock" means that the introduction of another basis
of distribution, in this case the sixteen dollars of additional capital, violated the
purpose of the subsection. That purpose, according to the Commissioner, is
continuity of shareholder interest. The fundamental reason why no gain or loss
is recognized under section 355 is that no tax should be imposed on the con-
tinuous ownership of the same assets by the same people when the only change
is a formal, organizational one.5" If a stock option method of distribution is
coupled with a money payment plan, argued the Commissioner, the distributee
stockholders may choose to sell their stock rights to outsiders rather than to make
the cash payments required to convert the rights into stock. Thus, the door
would be opened to "control' of the spun-off stock by new interests.
This argument was considered and rejected by the Tax Court.
If Congress had intended that a distribution of the Northwest stock be
treated as tax free when made without consideration it is inconceivable
that it could have intended the transaction to result in taxable income to
the distributees where they paid out money in connection with receiving
such stock.
51
In the view of the Tax Court, the requirement that the distribution be
made with respect to stock did not exclude an additional basis. Continuity of
interest was not threatened because more than 80% of the shares were in fact
finally distributed to Pacific stockholders, thus satisfying the control requirement
of section 355 (a) (1) (D) (i) or (ii). Judge Raum apparently felt that because
47 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1 (a) (1955): "For the purpose of Section 355, stock rights or stock
warrants are not included in the term 'stock and securities.' " For a good discussion of the
phrase, "stock and securities," see 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION, § 20.67
(rev. 1965).
48 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 90 (1965).
49 Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63, 71 (1937); Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d
684, 687 (2d Cir. 1942).
50 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954).
51 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 90 (1965).
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the crucial distribution took place when the rights were executed and because
"control" did in fact pass to Pacific stockholders at that time, there was no
problem with continuity of interest.52
In Gordon the Second Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that the distri-
bution of the warrants could not be taxed as such until executed and, when
so executed, there was a distribution of "stock" within the meaning of section
355 (a) (1) (A), and that continuity of interest was preserved since the distribu-
tion did in fact pass control of the new company to the Pacific stockholders. On
the issue of the significance of the sixteen dollars, however, the Second Circuit
seemed to go further than the Tax Court. The Tax Court opinion seems to
say that the addition of a consideration requirement does not violate the basis
for distribution requirement in section 355 (a) (1) (A), it just adds another factor.
The Second Circuit also discounted the sixteen dollar requirement but from a
slightly different approach. Rather than characterizing the addition of considera-
tion to the basis as a factor comprehended by the section, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the money paid out by the shareholders and the distribution of
stock were separate transactions. Judge Moore argued that the two transactions
should be re-separated for income tax purposes."3 Pointing to instances when
the Commissioner had used this step-transaction approach himself,5 4 the judge
asserted that this type of separation should be employed whenever necessary to
accomplish the economic purposes of the statute.5" But he was careful to add
that such a separation of transactions should never be used when ". . . the
coupling itself is promotive of the evils which the taxing statute was designed
to prevent .... "I' By taking this approach rather than the simpler Tax Court
rationale, the Second Circuit seems to hold by implication that if the considera-
tion is not so separated from the distribution, the distribution would fail. Separa-
tion saves the transaction. Thus, in Gordon the emphasis shifts from the dis-
tribution itself to the question of whether or not the taxpayer can take advantage
of the "step-transaction" approach. The Commissioner is generally privileged
to disregard form and separate steps in favor of overall substance,5 7 but the
taxpayer, on his part, has had a difficult time obtaining the benefit of this
reasoning.
58
52 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 94 n.9 (1965). See also Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d
495 n.17 (9th Cir. 1967).
53 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 506 (2d-Cir. 1967).
54 Id. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 63 (1962); Treas. Reg. § 1.331-
1(c) (1955). See also American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948);
Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 247, 251 (1954).
55 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 506 (2d Cir. 1967).
56 Id. at 506.
57 American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948); Rev. Rul. 61-156,
1961-2 Cum. BULL. 63 (1962).
58 The step approach was denied the taxpayer in Heller v. Commissioner, 2 T.G. 371
(1943). "A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because
reached by following a devious path." Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613
(1938). But see, Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U.
12TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 247, 248 (1954):
There was a tendency in the earlier cases to apply the doctrine only in favor of
the Government, while holding the taxpayer to the form he adopted and giving tax
effect to each step. That may still be the situation where the form is adopted as a
tax avoidance device, but in other situations it is no longer the rule. (Footnotes
omitted.)
[Vol. 43: 389] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In Baan the Commissioner's reasoning on the distribution argument pre-
vailed where it had failed in the Tax Court and the Second Circuit. At the outset,
the Ninth Circuit sidestepped the question of which distribution was crucial -
the distribution of rights or the distribution of stock upon their execution. As
Judge Hamley said:
For present purposes we may assume that intercession of a stock rights
scheme would not, standing alone, prevent a transfer of Northwest stock
from Pacific to taxpayers from constituting a distribution with respect to
taxpayers' ownership of Pacific's stock. 59
"But," he continued, "this stock rights scheme did not stand alone.""0 The
stock rights scheme was coupled with the sixteen dollar consideration require-
ment and, in the view of Judge Hamley, resembled a sale of corporate assets,
which is not a type of "distribution' contemplated by section 355. He thus
agreed with the Commissioner that throughout the Code the phrase "distributes
• . . with respect to stock" means a distribution without consideration. The tax-
payer took exception to this point by referring to section 301 of the Code which
also covers distributions made by a corporation to a shareholder ".... with respect
to its stock .... ,"61 The taxpayer contended that the Commissioner had taken
inconsistent positions on this point. On the one hand, he claimed that money
paid by the shareholders in connection with a section 355 distribution is enough
to take the transaction out of the section, but the same payment does not take
the distribution out of section 301 even though the same language is used.62
Judge Hamley answered by pointing out that section 301 relates to the
distribution of property, as defined in section 317 (a), while section 355 relates
to "solely stock or securities." 6 Stock rights are property within the coverage of
section 301, but not "stock or securities" within the scope of section 355.64
In holding that consideration is not contemplated in the phrase "with
respect to stock," the judge attempted to distinguish section 301 distributions
on the basis of what is distributed to the shareholders. Section 301 distributions
include stock rights, but section 355 distributions do not.65 What he seems to
have done is to decide what he earlier sidestepped. He bypassed the stock rights
scheme at first. But in order to hold that the distribution of rights is not within
section 355, he could not bypass it.
The Tax Court case and the Gordon case had focused on the distribution
after the stock rights were executed,66 but Judge Hamley focused on the distri-
bution of the rights themselves. As he saw it, the distribution of rights indirectly
represents taxable income because the amount of the dividend, determinable at
the time the shareholder of the distributing corporation exercises his rights, is
59 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1967).
60 Id.
61 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954 § 301(a).
62 The Commissioner's own regulations authorize the application of section 301 to a case
where the distributee gives value. See Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (j), (k) (1955).
63 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1967).
64 INT. REv. CODE or 1954 § 317(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1955).
65 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1967).




the difference between the market value of the stock and the purchase price called
for by the stock rights. This "spread" can be determined either when the rights
are issued or when they are executed, whichever is lower."'
This reasoning is ingenious but it does not satisfactorily answer the holding
in the Tax Court that there is no taxable distribution at all until the rights are
exercised. The determination of "spread" goes to the amount of the distribu-
tion that is taxable, it does not change the time when the distribution becomes
taxable. If the Tax Court and Gordon are right about the crucial time for
determining distribution, then Judge Hamley's attempt to distinguish "distribu-
tion... with respect to stock" under section 355 cannot stand because it is based
on the assumption that the things distributed under section 355 are stock rights.
Judge Hamley also took exception to the Tax Court's holding that Congress
could not want to exempt distributions without consideration and yet tax the
same distribution where money was paid out by the distributee. 8 He reasoned
that it would be perfectly reasonable for Congress to recognize such a distinction
because the basic assumption behind the tax concession in section 355 is that the
same people continue to own the same assets, changing only the formal structure
of their ownership. Congress could well conclude that this assumption would be
undermined if distribution were by means of transferable stock, rights, the
exercise of which may require substantial cash payments that many shareholders
will be unwilling to make. Being unwilling to make payment, many stockholders
would sell the issued rights and thereby disrupt the continuity of interest.
This argument does make a valid point. Congress may very, well have
intended that the phrases "solely stock and securities" in section 355 (a) (1) (A)
act as a safeguard, protecting against schemes which could potentially under-
mine the continuity of interest provided for in section 355 (a) (1) (D). The legis-
lative history, however, does not indicate that Congress had any such. intention,"°
and the Commissioner himself has permitted new stockholders to join a distribu-
tion where the circumstances disclose no intention to use the division as a device
to distribute earnings and profits.70
VI. A Single Distribution
The Commissioner argued that there is an implied requirement in section
355 that the distribution take place in a single offering and since Pacific utilized
two offerings separated by almost two years, this statutory requirement had not
been met. Although conceding the lack of direct authority on this point, he
contended that the overall scheme of section 355, in particular subsection (a)
(1) (D), demands such an interpretation. The subsection reads:
If -
67 See Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684, 687-88 (2d Cir. 1942). Cf. Commissioner
v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 249-50 (1956).
68 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 495 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Oscar E. Baan, 45
T.C. 71, 90 (1965).
69 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A127-28 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266-68 (1954).
70 Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 GCu. BULL. 77 (1959).
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(D) as part of the distribution, the distributing corporation dis-
tributes -
(i) all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation
held by it immediately before the distribution, or
(ii) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation constituting
control within the meaning of Section 368(c), and it is established
to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that the retention
by the distributing corporation of stock (or stock and securities) in
the controlled corporation was not in pursuance of a plan having as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to (and no amount shall be in-
cludible in the income of) such shareholder or security holder on the
receipt of such stock or securities.7'
These requirements, contended the Commissioner, were designed to prevent
periodic distribution of stock in the controlled corporation as a substitute for
dividends. 2 Thus, from the Commissioner's point of view, subsection (a) (1) (D)
strengthens the anti-tax-avoidance device provision of subsection (a) (1) (B).
We do not have the benefit of Judge Raum's view on this contention be-
cause the Commissioner failed to raise the issue in the Tax Court."3 The two
Circuit Courts did deal with the contention and they managed to spawn three
points of view. In addition to the two conflicting court opinions, the third view
is Judge Friendly's dissent in Gordon"4 which concentrated on the single distri-
bution issue.
The majority in Gordon felt that the Commissioner had taken an over-
strained view of subsection (a) (1) (D) when he read into it the single distri-
bution requirement. Judge Moore saw the subsection simply as the embodiment
of the congressional decision that only complete, not partial divisions, were to
receive tax-free status. To prevent abuse, the last phrase in subsection (a) (1)
(D) (ii) was added not so much to duplicate the "device" provision in subsec-
tion (a) (1) (B), but rather to require the taxpayer to come forward with evi-
dence that he had no tax avoidance objective when he partially retained the
controlled company stock, instead of requiring the Commissioner to make the
first move under subsection (a) (1) (B)."
The majority in Gordon viewed the distribution from a transactional ap-
proach. If complete distribution is contemplated, then the tax-free provisions
of section 355 will not be denied because the actual distributions take place in
more than one phase. On this point, Judge Friendly vigorously dissented in
Gordon. The main thrust of his dissent seems to be that by looking at the dis-
tribution as a transaction, the court has ignored the concept of the taxable year."
At the end of 1961, 57% of the Northwest stock had been distributed. Looking
at the 1961 return only, Pacific clearly did not pass the control necessary to
fall under section 355." Friendly went even further, however, in adopting the
71 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a) (1) (D).
72 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 508 (2d Cir. 1967).
73 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 496 n.19 (9th Cir. 1967).
74 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 510 (2d Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
75 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 507 (2d Cir. 1967).
76 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 511 (2d Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion). See
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 441; Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
77 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion);
INT. RE V. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c).
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Commissioner's argument that section 355 (a) (1) (D) must be interpreted as
requiring a single distribution in any case. In his view, the ordinary meaning
of subsection (a) (1) (D) is that Congress intended to offer a choice to corpora-
tions seeking division. Either they could distribute all the stock in the controlled
corporation at one time with no questions asked, or they could distribute not
less than 80% of the stock. If they choose the latter alternative, they must
satisfy the Commissioner that they did not retain the stock for the purpose of
tax evasion. Friendly argued that the words " '.. . immediately before the distribu-
tion,' when read against the basic concept of annual tax accounting, can only
mean to distribute all at one time.""8 The majority in Baan adopted the same
position as Judge Friendly's dissent."' Although they conceded that a multi-step
corporate reorganization may be treated as a single entity when executed in
pursuance of an antecedent agreement,"0 they distinguished the Baan case be-
cause Pacific and Northwest had given no definite date on which the remaining
shares would be distributed. The date depended on Pacific's need for additional
capital. This factor plus the gap of two taxable years between the phases of
distribution led the court to conclude, as did Judge Friendly, that section 355
anticipates a single offering."'
The committee reports contain very little mention of subsection (a) (1) (D),
even though this provision makes its first appearance in the 1954 Code. 2 The
only authority on the question of whether the distribution must be accomplished
in a single offering is the scholarship of Professors Bittker and Eustice who note
that:
The committee reports on the 1954 Code do not explain this limitation
[in Section 355 (a) (1) (D)] on the retention of stock or securities by the
distributing corporation, but presumably it was to prevent a parent corpora-
tion from making periodic distributions of small amounts of stock and
securities in a subsidiary as a substitute for ordinary dividends.8 3
After setting up this presumed purpose, however, they expose its weakness:
It is not clear, however, why periodic distributions of small amounts of
the controlled corporation's stock should be treated as a dividend, once
78 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 513 (2d Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
79 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1967). The court did not hold
that a single distribution was required, in the literal sense, because of the difficulties of admin-
istration. But they did hold that such distributions must not extend over any greater period of
time than is reasonably necessary considering the practical problems involved in completing
such distributions. Id. at 498.
80 See Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940). Von's In-
vestment Co. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1937).
81 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1967).
82 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1954). The report deals briefly with sub-
section (a) (1) (D) :
Subparagraph (D) of paragraph (1) requires that in order for a transaction to
qualify under Section 355, the distributing corporation must distribute either all of
the stock and securities of the controlled corporation, or an amount of stock con-
stituting control within the meaning of Section 368(c) (i.e., 80 percent of the
voting power and total number of shares), and the Secretary must be satisfied that
no avoidance of taxes was intended. This requirement is a change from present
law and the House bill.
83 B. BIrTER & J. EUSTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPoRATIONS AND SsLARE-
HOLDERS § 11.07, at 479 (2d ed. 1966).
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the basic policy decision to permit a tax-free distribution of all of its stock
and securities under § 355 was made. The theory that underlies § 355,
if valid at all, seems as applicable to a partial separation of the controlled
corporation as to a complete separation. Perhaps the draftsmen of §
355(a) (1) (D) were concerned about a distribution of part of the con-
trolled corporation's stock or securities in anticipation of a sale by the
distributees. But the "device" language of § 355(a) (1) (B) serves as an
independent restriction on sales, at least if they are prearranged; .. .and
no reason suggests itself for imposing a more severe restriction on sale of
all the stock received in a partial separation than on a sale of part of the
stock received in a complete separation.8 4
This attack makes more sense than the presumption that they construct as a target.
To contend that section 355 (a) (1) (D) requires a single offering in all cases
is certainly an extravagant application of judicial gloss.
It would seem that the Pacific transaction fails to qualify for a much more
basic reason and that reason is the focal point of Judge Friendly's dissent. Even
if the distribution may be in the form of two or more separate offerings, the
taxpayer should not be able to fall under the provisions of section 355 (a) (1) (D)
when his offerings cover more than one taxable year. At the end of 1961, the
first Pacific offering had distributed about 57% of the Northwest stock. At the
close of the taxable year, Pacific had not in fact distributed "control" as defined
by section 368(c) and as required by section 355(a) (1) (D). The taxpayer
argued that the transactional approach should be applied in this situation and
pointed to Portland Oil Company v. Commissioner,8 5 and Von's Investment
Company v. Commissioner,86 both cases involving the taxation of reorganizations
and both cases permitted the taxpayer to treat separate distributions as one
transaction when they were executed pursuant to an antecedent agreement."
An examination of both cases, however, reveals that although the distributions
pursuant to the agreement were separate, they occurred within the same taxable
year.88 It may very well be entirely consistent with the spirit of section 355 (a)
(1) (D) to permit separate offerings to be treated as one distribution if pursuant
to an overall plan to distribute "control" to the shareholders, but the section
should not be read so as to permit the distributing corporation the luxury of
ignoring the concept of the taxable year.89
VII. Gain or Loss
Finally, the Commissioner argued that contrary to the requirement of
section 355 (b) (2) (C), Northwest acquired its telephone business from Pacific
in a transaction in which gain was "recognized." 9 Subsection (b) provides in
part as follows:
84 Id.
85 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940).
86 92 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1937).
87 Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir. 1940); Von's Invest-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1937).
88 Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 484 (1st Cir. 1940); Von's Invest-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1937).
89 Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).




(b) Requirements as to active business.
(1) In General.' Subsection (a) shall apply only if either-
(A) The distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation
*.. is engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct
of a trade or business, or
(2) Definition. For purposes of paragraph (1), a corporation shall
be treated as engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business if -and
only if-
(A) it is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business, or
substantially all of its assets consist of stock and securities of a corpora-
tion controlled by it (immediately after the distribution) which is so
engaged,
(B) such trade or business has been actively conducted throughout
the 5-year period ending on the date of the distribution,
(C) such trade or business was not acquired within the period
described in subparagraph (B) in a transaction in which gain or loss
was recognized in whole or in part .... 91
The Commissioner contended that the $200,000,000 note given by Northwest
to Pacific was other property not protected by section 351 (a),9 2 and because
it was "boot," the controlled corporation had acquired its business in a transac-
tion in which gain or loss had been recognized within the prohibited five-year
period of section 355.
During 1961, the year in which the asset stock exchange was consummated,
both Pacific and Northwest were subsidiaries of American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company and joined with it in the filing of a consolidated return." Thus,
any gain that may have resulted from the transaction had the exchanging com-
panies been independent was eliminated by the consolidated return. The Com-
missioner, while conceding that no gain was in fact realized, still maintained
that a gain was "recognized" within the terms of section 355(b) (2) (C). 9"
The taxpayer's defense was two-fold; he contended (1) that the note was
security which, like stock, can be received without recognition of gain under
section 351 (a), and (2) that if no gain is realized because of the consolidated
return, none is recognized under section 355 (b) (2) (C)."
The Tax Court never ruled on the taxpayer's first contention because Judge
Raum refused to accept the Commissioner's distinction between gain that is
"realized" and gain that is "recognized" for the purposes of section 351.9 Once
this decision was made, then the elimination of gain or loss under the consolidated
return regulations satisfied the no-recognition-of-gain-or-loss requirement of
section 355 (b) (2) (C)."r
91 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(b).
92 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 92 (1965).
93 Id. at 83.
94 Id. at 93.
95 Id. at 92.
96 Id. at 93-94.
97 The consolidated return regulations were changed in 1966 to provide that intercompany
exchanges result in a recognition of gain to the exchanging parties, although the gain is de-
ferred until a subsequent event. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13 (1966). This would seem to argue
for a different result in future cases.
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The Second Circuit agreed with the Tax Court, but for different reasons. 8
Judge Moore felt that the purpose of subsections (b) (2) (C) and (D) argued
against the Tax Court rationale. The subsections were included to eliminate
the possibility that one corporation might purchase another corporation for the
purpose of distributing its stock as a dividend, while avoiding the tax on divi-
dends. This danger is not diminished because the corporations involved are
affiliated. Looking again at the purpose behind the statute, however, Judge
Moore held that section 355(b) (2) (C) was not meant to apply to the present
fact situation. The real danger was that one corporation would bring new assets
within its shell before or as part of a section 355 division. The draftsmen did
not intend the subsection to reach intercorporate transfers where no new assets
were brought within the shell of the dividing corporation."9 Judge Moore's
point here is well taken. The active business requirement in section 355(b)
seems to be directed at new assets and operations. New assets could be acquired
from an affiliated company in violation of the purpose of the section, yet it would
never show up on a consolidated return.
On the other hand, there is no danger that new assets will be acquired and
distributed in a section 355 division when the transaction involves assets within
the same corporate shell during the five years prior to distribution. The Senate
committee report indicates that the requirement in subsection (b) (2) (C) ap-
plies to acquisition of the trade or business five years prior to the date of dis-
tribution.' Because this provision is part of the active business requirement,
it appears that the drafters were thinking primarily of acquisitions prior to the
division, not acquisitions that are part of the division itself and involve only inter-
corporate property.
VIII. Conclusion
Both the Baan and the Gordon decisions argue well for their respective
conclusions. The opinions were well reasoned and carefully written. The diver-
gent results can be traced to the way both courts approached section 355. In
Baan the court gave primary consideration to the danger of tax evasion inherent
in corporate divisions. This view naturally led to a restrictive interpretation
of section 355.
On the other hand, the Gordon court found a legislative intent to encourage
legitimate corporate division, and facilitation of these divisions spawned a more
liberal approach to the specific provisions of the section. The rationale behind
the taxation of reorganizations generally is subject to either the Baan or Gordon
analysis, and a resolution of this conflict by the Supreme Court could act as a
directive in this unsettled area.
Thomas M. Ward
98 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1967).
99 Id. at 507.
100 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (1954).
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